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It is now ten years since African Heads of State made 
their declaration in support of the continent’s agricultural 
sector in Maputo in July 2003. This paper contributes to 
a small but growing body of independent critical analysis 
of CAADP, and to debates on future directions for the 
programme. The paper draws on studies of CAADP 
engagement in six countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania) plus preliminary 
reflections on two more (Kenya and Mozambique)1. Its 
particular contribution is to examine CAADP’s interaction 
with domestic political incentives for support to 
smallholder agriculture in African countries. Following 
Poulton 2012, we differentiate countries according to 
whether the domestic political incentives to invest in 
smallholder agriculture are strong or weak. In the former, 
the key question for CAADP is what value it can add to 
existing policy and planning frameworks for the 
agriculture sector. In the latter, which are more numerous, 
the key question is whether the CAADP process contains 
any mechanisms or provisions that can significantly 
change the incentives perceived by the governments in 
question. Experience to date is reviewed and ways 
forward for CAADP’s second decade are suggested.
CAADP
The history of CAADP is well explained by Kolavalli et 
al. 2010 and Brüntrup 2011. Agriculture was high on the 
priority list of the founders of NEPAD (NEPAD / African 
Union 2001) and hence work on an agricultural 
development programme for the continent began 
quickly after the establishment of NEPAD in 2001-02. As 
pointed out by Brüntrup 2011, the underlying principles 
of CAADP, which have not changed despite revisions to 
CAADP’s operational strategy, flow from those of NEPAD. 
These include i) a broad accommodation with the 
prevailing market-oriented international development 
paradigm, whilst ii) re-establishing African institutions 
(and especially governments) firmly at the centre of 
policy and planning processes, and also iii) a pan-Africanist 
approach to tackling common development challenges. 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
which had an African Director General (and compatriot 
to one of NEPAD’s five initiating presidents), played a 
central role in the initial development of CAADP. In 
collaboration with the NEPAD Secretariat, FAO facilitated 
the production of the CAADP framework document (New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development 2003), which was 
adopted first by African Ministers of Agriculture meeting 
in Rome in June 2002. At the second regular summit of 
the new African Union in Maputo in July 2003 African 
Heads of State committed to implement CAADP “as a 
matter of urgency” (Assembly of the African Union 2003).
At this stage the emphasis was primarily on mobilising 
investment in four main areas (the four CAADP “pillars” 
that remain today): land and water management, rural 
infrastructure for market access, increasing food supply 
(reducing hunger) and agricultural research. New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development 2003 estimated a 
total investment cost for the four pillars around the 
continent of US$251 billion over the period 2002-2015, 
to be sought from both domestic budgets and donor 
support. As part of the Maputo Declaration, African Heads 
of State agreed “to adopt sound policies for agricultural 
and rural development, and commit ourselves to 
allocating at least 10% of national budgetary resources 
for their implementation within five years”.
Following the Maputo Declaration, FAO were 
commissioned to identify bankable investment 
projects around the continent. According to Brüntrup 
2011, by 2004 FAO had developed country investment 
programmes for 49 African countries and “validated” 
these in national stakeholder workshops. However, 
the impact of this effort was “negligible” (p84): the 
programmes were not integrated with countries’ national 
agricultural strategies, so gained neither government 
nor donor buy-in and as a result were not implemented.
From 2005, therefore, the NEPAD Secretariat began 
to develop a new strategy for realising CAADP objectives. 
This placed much greater emphasis on influencing and 
improving national agricultural policy formulation2. It 
envisaged a process for developing and gaining 
consensus around an overarching national agricultural 
policy. This process would be launched at a multi-
stakeholder workshop, then enter a technical phase of 
policy review and modelling, generating outputs for 
deliberation at a second multi-stakeholder event (known 
as a Round Table) that would culminate in the signing 
of a “CAADP Compact” by representatives of government, 
non-state actors, regional and continental institutions, 
and donors (NEPAD 2010). The Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) of the African Union thus became 
important players within the CAADP approach, charged 
with taking “leadership in stimulating, coordinating and 
facilitating support (financial, expert/technical, 
information etc.) for country CAADP implementation 
processes” (NEPAD 2010, p7). During this phase, too, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) were 
brought on board to provide technical support to CAADP, 
including conducting the modelling work to inform 
country-level processes.
The new strategy was launched in 2006 and it was 
anticipated that more than 30 countries would have their 
Compact signed by March 2007 (Brüntrup 2011). In the 
event, just one country, Rwanda, had pioneered the 
process by this time. Meanwhile, some countries and 
donors questioned the value of another policy and 
planning process that could potentially duplicate or 
compete with existing national-level processes that they 
were already committed to.
The event that restored momentum to CAADP was 
the 2007-08 food price crisis. Within Africa, at least 14 
countries experienced food riots (Berazneva and Lee 
2013), raising the political importance of paying attention 
to agriculture. Several of the countries that experienced 
riots (including Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Burkina Faso) were in West Africa. In response, ECOWAS, 
charged with promoting CAADP within the West Africa 
region, used its own funds to encourage the organisation 
of CAADP launches in member countries and also to pay 
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for technical input into the stocktaking and review 
processes prior to the Round Table meetings. Nine 
countries within the ECOWAS region signed their CAADP 
Compacts in the final quarter of 20093.
Meanwhile, delegates at the G8 summit at L’Aquila in 
July 2009 announced US$20 billion in aid to support 
“sustainable agriculture development” as part of their 
response to the crisis. In line with principles agreed in 
Accra in 2008 to enhance aid effectiveness, the L’Aquila 
Declaration stated that the US$20 billion in aid would 
be used to “support the implementation of country and 
regional agricultural strategies and plans through 
country-led coordination processes” (G8 Heads of State 
and others 2009, para 10). In Africa this translated into 
support for strategies and investment plans produced 
through the CAADP process (para 11). Importantly, US 
support to agricultural development in Africa – increased 
as a result of the launch of the Feed the Future programme 
– was then linked to implementation of CAADP, as was 
access to funds from the multilateral Global Agriculture 
and Food Security Program (GAFSP) that was established 
following the L’Aquila pledges.
These donor decisions to link aid for agriculture to 
implementation of CAADP catalysed the CAADP process 
in many additional African countries. By the end of 2010, 
22 countries had signed CAADP Compacts and 14 of 
these had also concluded a subsequent Business Meeting 
at which different stakeholders (government, donors, 
private sector) met to commit funding for the 
implementation of the country’s CAADP investment plan. 
By February 2013 30 countries had signed CAADP 
Compacts and 22 of these had also concluded a Business 
Meeting.
However, the new donor interest also changed the 
dynamics of CAADP. Governments might now enter the 
CAADP process primarily in the hope of securing 
additional donor funds - or, worse, simply to avoid losing 
access to donor funds – without any renewed or even 
strong commitment to supporting smallholder 
agriculture. 
For NEPAD the new donor interest meant that guidance 
on country-level CAADP processes had to be formalised. 
Positively, it also led to some additional attention to what 
should happen after the signing of a CAADP Compact 
(Brüntrup 2011).
Assessing the Effectiveness of 
CAADP: Conceptual Challenges
Whilst it is now a decade since the Maputo Declaration, 
the brief review above indicates that most CAADP activity 
at country level has only occurred during the past 3-4 
years. Is it too early to be looking for impact? For its 
supporters, one of the merits of CAADP is its foundation 
in the declaration made by African Heads of State at 
Maputo in 2003, hence its claim both to reflect but also 
to seek to further enhance political commitment to 
invest in agriculture in Africa. Whilst the commitment to 
raise the share of national budget dedicated to agriculture 
was supposed to be worked out through the CAADP 
planning process (which got off to a false start in 2003-05 
and arguably was still not fully worked out until 2010), 
it is not entirely dependent upon that process. There has 
thus been a full decade for African governments to invest 
more in agriculture since Maputo.
Meanwhile, the CAADP process, especially post-2005, 
seeks to enhance the quality of national agricultural 
policy and planning. (In practice there has been more 
emphasis to date on overarching policy objectives and 
associated investment planning than on detailed policy 
for particular value chains or enhanced service delivery). 
There has now been one round of CAADP-compliant 
“planning” in 20-30 countries. It should thus be possible 
to draw some preliminary conclusions on the impact of 
the process on agricultural planning. Where it is rather 
early to see change is in the quality of investment and 
policy implementation, given how recent many of the 
Business Meetings have been. Nevertheless, even here 
some pertinent observations can be made.
A second major issue when seeking to assess the 
effectiveness of CAADP is the problem of attribution: to 
say what difference CAADP has made, we need to form 
a judgement as to what would have happened without 
CAADP. This almost inevitably involves an element of 
subjectivity. However, one of the contributions of this 
paper is to differentiate between countries where the 
domestic political incentives to support smallholder 
agricultural policy might be described as strong from 
those where they are weak. In the former case, but not 
in the latter, one could reasonably have expected 
concerted policy actions and investment in agriculture 
even without CAADP. 
The strength of political incentives to support 
smallholder agricultural policy was investigated during 
the first phase of Future Agricultures’ PEAPA work. From 
a political economy perspective, incentives may be 
assessed as strong where a government perceives that 
it has to prioritise investment in smallholder agriculture 
in order to remain in power (Drazen 2008) or to maintain 
medium-long term political stability. Given the large 
share of the population in many African countries that 
lives in rural areas, democratisation might be expected 
to increase the incentives to invest in smallholder 
agriculture in order to maintain power. However, Poulton 
2012 finds that African governments have a variety of 
ways of maintaining support – including appeals to 
ethnic allegiance, control over land access and focusing 
attention on local development issues – such that rural 
voters can only rarely be said to exchange their votes for 
better agricultural policy and/or enhanced investment. 
Instead, incentives are seen to be strong where 
governments recognise they could be vulnerable to 
(eventual) overthrow if they do not generate broad-
based benefits for rural populations, i.e. the poor 
majority. In our sample these dynamics are observed in 
Rwanda and Ethiopia where the current government 1) 
originally came to power by force, 2) had its roots in a 
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movement to defend or champion a particular minority 
group, but 3) needs much broader support to remain 
in power, and meanwhile 4) faces multiple threats to 
its continuation in power.  These countries have also 
been characterised by strong political leadership, 
which in turn has contributed to effective agricultural 
policy. However, the circumstances that create strong 
incentives for investment in smallholder agriculture 
may also be conducive to the emergence of strong 
leaders - “When the going gets tough, the tough get 
going!” – and encourage other elite members to follow 
them. In such contexts, the outcomes that flow from 
agricultural policy implementation are all-important 
and governments tend to display an eagerness to learn 
what works and what doesn’t. If the possible threat to 
regime survival is medium-term, rather than immediate4, 
such governments may well see the logic of investing in 
classic agricultural public goods, that exhibit the greatest 
returns to growth and poverty reduction (Mogues et al. 
2012) but which do not necessarily yield these returns 
within a single electoral cycle. This is in contrast to 
governments in many African countries which came 
to power through the ballot box, and whose primary 
concern is now short-term survival at the next election.
The next section presents very simple narratives of 
the CAADP experience in the eight countries covered in 
the study, relating this to the observed strength of the 
domestic political incentives to invest in agriculture 
within these countries. After this the paper examines 
drivers of CAADP adoption across countries and considers 
what difference, if any, CAADP has made at country level. 
Here it considers political commitment to supporting 
smallholder agriculture, the quality of agricultural 
planning, donor alignment and the implementation of 
agricultural strategies across the eight countries. It is 
observed that domestic political incentives determine 
how and why countries engage with the CAADP process 
and that CAADP has so far achieved little real “traction” 
in countries where domestic political incentives to invest 
in smallholder agriculture are weak. Thus, the key 
questions for CAADP are:
•	 In countries where domestic political 
incentives to invest in smallholder agriculture 
are strong, what value it can add to existing 
policy and planning frameworks for the 
agriculture sector?
•	 In countries where they are weak, does 
the CAADP process contain any “levers” 
(mechanisms or provisions) that can 
significantly change the incentives perceived 
by the governments in question? How can 
the levers that do exist be strengthened?
The final section considers ways forward for CAADP, 
seeking to answer these two questions.
CAADP Storylines
Considering the same eight countries that feature in 
the current study, Poulton 2012 highlights the strong 
domestic political incentives to invest in smallholder 
agriculture in Rwanda and Ethiopia. In both cases a 
combination of history plus current internal and external 
opposition (including an armed component) means that 
the government knows it has to deliver broad-based 
benefits to the population, and perhaps especially the 
rural population, in order to justify its hold on power. 
Attention to smallholder agriculture is the most obvious 
way to do this. In Ethiopia the EPRDF administration has 
a long track record of prioritising agricultural investment 
(Berhanu 2012). By contrast, in Rwanda the conversion 
to pro-agricultural policy in practice is rather more recent 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Rwanda has already 
been singled out as the pioneer of the CAADP process 
in Africa. Following poor harvests and disappointing 
poverty reduction figures in the mid-2000s, President 
Kagame and others within RPF, convinced of the need 
to raise the priority of agricultural investment, used 
CAADP to make their case both to others within 
government and to donors, who had previously placed 
greater emphasis on social sector spending (Golooba-
Mutebi forthcoming). 
Ethiopia was also a relatively early adopter of CAADP 
(fifth country to sign its Compact). It looked to CAADP 
to mobilise additional donor funds for its agricultural 
investment ambitions during a period of delicate 
relationships with donors, due to its clampdown on 
domestic opposition groups, but also when key donors 
such as the US were “indebted” to it for its role in 
combating Islamic extremism in neighbouring Somalia 
(Berhanu 2013).
Within our sample, a further three countries may be 
classed as having intermediate domestic political 
incentives to invest in smallholder agriculture. Burkina 
Faso is a landlocked country where mineral revenues 
only recently came on stream. Here, agriculture plays a 
critical role in the (political) economy5, as a source of 
livelihoods for a majority of the population, of foreign 
exchange and of rents for the elite (Loada 2012).  There 
is thus some alignment of elite interests with those of 
the majority of the population, as all need agriculture to 
succeed. Burkina was one of the countries to suffer urban 
food riots in 2008 and where ECOWAS sought to catalyse 
the CAADP process in response. However, it was also one 
of the countries where the introduction of CAADP met 
with initial resistance both within government and from 
several donors, as it was introduced in such a way as to 
cut across existing agricultural policy and planning 
processes. This mistake was later rectified and a recast 
process has led to productive discussions about strategic 
priorities for the sector (Loada forthcoming). 
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In Malawi the farm inputs subsidy programme has 
attained considerable political prominence in another 
landlocked, agriculture-dependent economy - one where 
maize has a central place in livelihoods in almost all parts 
of the country (Chinsinga 2012). In the past decade a key 
“problem” for agricultural policy, from a technical 
perspective, has been that the subsidy programme has 
come to dominate government spending and absorb 
personnel resources to the detriment of other agricultural 
interventions, even though complementary services, 
such as extension, would enhance the subsidy 
programme’s impact on growth and poverty reduction. 
Meanwhile, following the 2009 election, disastrous high-
level decision making sent the Malawian economy into 
a downward spiral, exacerbated by the resulting strained 
relationships with donors. The government realised that 
participation in CAADP could become a precondition 
for accessing desperately needed agricultural funding, 
whilst donors hoped that the CAADP process would 
facilitate a dialogue on diversifying agricultural 
investment beyond the subsidy programme. 
Unfortunately, in an atmosphere of some mutual mistrust, 
no progress was achieved on this latter score (Chinsinga 
forthcoming).
In Ghana political incentives to invest in agriculture 
are focused firstly on cocoa (Whitfield 2011), due to its 
contribution to wider economic growth, which voters 
value highly (Lindberg 2011). Beyond cocoa, there is a 
remarkably strong neoliberal consensus amongst 
technocrats, donors and even politicians, who seem 
willing to let technocrats and donors largely determine 
what is funded. Here an exemplary CAADP process was 
observed, but it is nevertheless hard to ascribe any 
significant change to it, for reasons that will be explained 
below (Kolavalli et al. 2010).
Three countries in the study stand out for their 
apparently weak political incentives to invest in 
smallholder agriculture. In Tanzania the ruling party CCM 
has retained reasonably strong rural support despite 
delivering little in the way of rural economic growth or 
poverty reduction. Whilst the 2010 election perhaps 
provided a warning as to the dangers of this, the 
government’s ability to respond seems constrained by 
the ineffectiveness of the state machinery (Therkildsen 
2011)6. Multiple state and donor programmes and 
initiatives make little difference on the ground (Cooksey 
2012). The first consequence of CAADP in Tanzania, 
therefore, was to add another acronym (TAFSIP) to the 
existing list of agricultural programmes, but with little 
prospect of improving implementation of any of them. 
Meanwhile, the government is wondering whether large-
scale private sector-led agricultural development could 
succeed where state-led initiatives have failed. Professed 
alignment with CAADP provides legitimacy for such 
endeavours, which are being focused on the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), even 
though the outcomes for smallholders from such 
development are unclear (Cooksey, 2014). 
In Mozambique rapid economic growth is now driven 
by minerals extraction, whilst dispersed smallholders - in 
a country with low population density and where the 
more productive agricultural land is over 1000km from 
the capital – exert little pressure on policy makers. 
Mozambique was a relatively late starter in CAADP terms. 
Its engagement was stimulated by a break-down in 
previous government-donor relations in the agriculture 
sector, hence the need to revive donor support. However, 
top politicians remain unsure what role smallholder 
agriculture should play in Mozambique’s increasingly 
mineral-based and urbanising economy, so the prospects 
for strong and coherent policy to support smallholders 
are slim. This is compounded by the generous tax breaks 
given to minerals investors, which undermines the 
revenues that the government has at its disposal for 
investment in support of smallholder production (C. 
Castel-Branco, pers.comm.).
Finally, in Kenya regional interests do exert pressure 
for state support to selective commodity sub-sectors, 
for example maize in the Rift Valley. However, larger 
farmers and their needs dominate the dialogue. Policy 
thus contributes to the reproduction of inequality, which 
is high (World Bank 2008). By contrast, the 2004 Strategy 
for Revitalising Agriculture prioritised parastatal reform 
and public goods provision, which should benefit a wider 
spectrum of producers, but almost no progress was made 
on this agenda by 2012 (Poulton and Kanyinga 2013). 
Kenya is another country where CAADP met initial 
resistance, on the grounds that it duplicated existing 
policy initiatives. Whilst the process has now formally 
proceeded on the basis that existing policy is broadly 
CAADP compliant, the key question is where the drive 
to implement policy on behalf of the majority of 
smallholders will come from. 
Drivers of CAADP Adoption
One of the central claims about CAADP is that it is an 
African-owned initiative, as exemplified by the 2003 
Maputo Declaration. Similarly, national CAADP processes 
are said to be country-led. However, as noted above, 
Rwanda was the only country in our sample to sign a 
CAADP Compact before major donors moved to align 
their agricultural support to CAADP processes, thereby 
fundamentally altering the incentives for participating 
in CAADP. 
The very notion of country ownership is anyway 
somewhat problematic where countries depend heavily 
on donor support for their national budgets, so have to 
anticipate what donors might be willing to fund. The 
following summary shows limited country ownership of 
CAADP processes to date. This is consistent with the 
generally low domestic political incentives to invest in 
smallholder agriculture, although it is also in part a 
reflection on how CAADP has been presented and even 
conceived to date. 
As already noted, two of the countries in our sample 
(Rwanda and Ethiopia) exhibit a strong domestic drive 
to develop smallholder agriculture. Both used the CAADP 
process as a way of seeking greater donor support for 
their efforts at critical junctures. The Rwanda government 
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was initially disappointed in the donor response, 
although they found an increasing receptivity after the 
2008 food price crisis (Brüntrup 2011). Being the CAADP 
pioneer also gave the Rwanda government a chance to 
make a good impression on its African peers. Meanwhile, 
the Ethiopian government looked to CAADP, with its 
legitimacy as a continent-wide programme, to mobilise 
additional donor funds for its agricultural development 
plans during a period of delicate relationships with 
donors. It is as yet unclear whether or not it was successful 
in this.
In the remaining six countries, adoption of CAADP 
was pushed to a greater or lesser degree by NEPAD 
officials or the relevant REC. In Burkina, as a result of 
ECOWAS’ prompting, the CAADP process started before 
the major agricultural donors moved to align their 
support to CAADP. However, as noted above, it was 
introduced in such a way as to cut across existing 
agricultural policy and planning processes. This problem 
had to be resolved before Burkina could proceed to the 
signing of the country Compact (Loada forthcoming). 
ECOWAS was similarly active in Ghana. However, in part 
due to a coincidence of timing, in Ghana the CAADP 
process was readily dovetailed with the revision of the 
main national agricultural strategy, FASDEP II.
In Kenya, COMESA made repeated overtures, from 
2006, to encourage the government to sign up to the 
CAADP process. However, these met with opposition 
from senior government figures within the agricultural 
arena, who argued that Kenya had its own agricultural 
strategy and that engagement with CAADP would entail 
unnecessary duplication of effort. In the end, the Kenya 
government signed a CAADP Compact once it became 
clear that its own national agricultural strategy could be 
the basis for this – and primarily to satisfy certain donors 
that were urging it to do so (K.Kanyinga, pers. comm). It 
thus combined the launch of a new national strategy, 
ASDS, with the signing of its CAADP Compact in July 
2010.
Similarly, in the remaining three countries, NEPAD 
officials formally sought to encourage the CAADP 
process. However, the government decision to engage 
owed as much to the signals that it was receiving from 
donors. In Malawi and Tanzania, the decision of the US 
government to channel USAID funding for agriculture 
and nutrition in support of country-led processes 
(interpreted as CAADP) was an important factor. In 
Mozambique the belated government decision to sign 
up to CAADP reflected a need to mend fences with 
agriculture sector donors, who were drifting away in 
frustration at the government’s lack of commitment to 
the sector. It is unclear whether it also signalled any 
genuine new commitment to agriculture, following food 
riots in several of the country’s urban areas in 2010.
What Difference Has CAADP 
Made at Country Level?
In this section we draw cross-cutting lessons regarding 
the impact of CAADP at country level. 
Political Commitment to 
Supporting Smallholder Agriculture
The share of the national budget devoted to the 
agricultural sector is a highly imperfect indicator of the 
extent to which policy supports smallholder agricultural 
producers (see below). However, as highlighted by the 
Maputo Declaration, it is a somewhat stronger indicator 
of the degree of political commitment to supporting the 
agricultural sector.
Fan et al. 2009 report that few African countries had 
reached the Maputo target of devoting 10% of their 
national budget to the agricultural sector by 2008 (the 
deadline set in the Maputo Declaration). Moreover, some 
of the countries that did so (for example, Burkina Faso 
and Ethiopia) already devoted more than 10% of their 
national budget to the agricultural sector in 2003. More 
recent assessments  confirm that it is still only a small 
minority of countries that have reached the Maputo 10% 
target (ActionAid 2013; Benin and Yu 2013; ONE 2013). 
Whilst agricultural expenditures have increased rapidly 
over the past decade, so have overall budgets, such that 
on average the share of national budgets devoted to 
agricultural and rural development has actually fallen 
slightly (Benin and Yu 2013).
In regard to the budget share target, we can distinguish 
three different dynamics across the eight countries in 
the PEAPA sample.
In Ethiopia and Burkina, the share of the national 
budget devoted to the agricultural sector exceeded 10% 
in 2008, but had done so throughout the period since 
2003. In Malawi a large increase in agricultural budget 
share occurred as a result of the introduction of the farm 
input subsidy programme starting in 2005-06. This was 
driven by short-term political considerations (Chinsinga 
2012), rather than any commitment to CAADP. In all three 
countries the efficiency of agricultural expenditure is a 
big issue. In Ethiopia, the government has made 
unparalleled investments in agricultural extension (Davis 
et al. 2010), with some beneficial impacts on growth and 
poverty reduction (Dercon et al. 2008). However, 
according to Berhanu 2012, this investment has been 
driven by twin objectives of growth and political control, 
and there is a trade-off between the two: the imperative 
of political control sits uneasily with a facilitating, 
participatory approach to extension and has also meant 
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that the government has been resistant to advice to 
liberalise key input markets even though greater choice 
for farmers could enhance the returns to extension 
investment. In Burkina there is an apparent disconnect 
between recent investment levels and observed 
agricultural sector performance7. In Malawi the budgetary 
and administrative priority given to the subsidy 
programme has led to neglect of complementary 
interventions that could raise the returns to subsidy 
expenditure.  
Ghana and Rwanda are perhaps the most interesting 
cases. As in Malawi, the share of public expenditure 
devoted to the agricultural sector has risen significantly 
since 2003. In Ghana there was a steady increase in the 
share of actual expenditure devoted to agriculture over 
the decade 2001-11, from an average of 6.4% during 
2001-03 to 9% during 2004-07, then reaching or 
exceeding 10% during 2008-11 (World Bank 2013)8. 
Moreover, the share of agricultural expenditure 
accounted for by cocoa fell over time, though it remains 
disproportionate to its contribution to sector GDP. The 
government of President Kufuor apparently took its 
Maputo commitment seriously, with reference to the 10% 
target appearing in the FASDEP II (2007) agricultural 
strategy9. On the other hand, the share of agricultural 
expenditure accounted for by donors also increased from 
2005, which may partly account for the shifting 
composition of expenditure towards food staples as well 
as the increasing share of actual expenditure. Ghana has 
also made great strides in reducing the incidence of 
extreme poverty, which has focused attention on the 
fact that remaining poverty is increasingly concentrated 
in the agricultural (especially food crop) regions of the 
north of the country. However, the introduction of a 
fertiliser subsidy in 2008 (Banful 2011), subsequently 
expanded in 2009 under an NDC government, is a rare 
example of a major agricultural programme to particularly 
direct expenditure towards the north of the country.
In Rwanda the increase in budget allocation to the 
agricultural sector was more dramatic and coincided with 
the signing of the CAADP compact. However, the driving 
force behind these changes was the realisation by senior 
politicians, following publication of new national poverty 
figures in 2006, that the government had to give greater 
priority to agriculture if it was to realise its objective of 
broad-based growth and poverty reduction (Golooba-
Mutebi forthcoming). At this point, President Kagame, 
a strong supporter of NEPAD, looked to CAADP as a 
vehicle for making his case to others within government 
and the donor community. The modelling support 
provided by IFPRI was very helpful in this. Subsequently 
the government has dramatically increased the share of 
its budget devoted to agriculture and, with effective 
delivery of interventions, has seen benefits in terms of 
both agricultural production and greatly accelerated 
poverty reduction. It is now committed to expanding 
the agriculture share beyond 10% of the national budget 
in the next few years. 
A common feature in Ghana and Rwanda has been 
the 2003 leaders’ (i.e. Presidents Kufuor and Kagame) 
commitment to the broader NEPAD pan-African vision. 
This appears to have translated into a commitment to 
the basic Maputo budget commitment (Ghana) and a 
sympathetic attitude towards the CAADP process 
(Rwanda).
Meanwhile, in Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique – the 
countries that we characterise as having low political 
incentives for support to smallholder agriculture - the 
share of the budget devoted to agriculture has fluctuated 
around the 5% level over the past decade, with no 
discernible trend or CAADP effect.
Quality of Agricultural Planning
All countries had a process for agricultural planning 
prior to CAADP. In theory, CAADP could aspire to improve 
the quality of this process, where this is/was deficient, 
or it could focus primarily on increasing the resources 
invested in the agricultural sector, subject to “due 
diligence” checks that the planning framework to guide 
the use of these resources is/was adequate. In practice, 
the balance across these two objectives could vary from 
country to country.
There are two main ways in which the CAADP process, 
as currently conceived, may improve the quality of the 
agricultural planning process: by encouraging greater 
participation by civil society and commercial private 
sector actors in priority setting and by making available 
additional technical expertise to inform the process. 
These are considered below. Before this, though, it is 
worth noting that an early critique was that CAADP was 
simply duplicating existing agricultural planning 
processes (Zimmerman et al. 2009). Mindful of this, 
CAADP processes have increasingly adopted existing 
strategies and plans, with limited checks or amendments 
to ensure that these are “CAADP-compliant”. Within our 
sample countries, this has been true for Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi and Tanzania. This, however, means that to date 
CAADP can have had little impact on the quality of the 
agricultural planning process in these countries10. 
Instead, the de facto approach was to perform “due 
diligence” checks to ensure that the planning framework 
was adequate to guide the use of the anticipated 
additional resources directed at agriculture.
Participation by civil society and commercial private 
sector actors in the CAADP process should be assessed 
in relation to the degree of participation in existing 
agricultural planning processes. It should also be seen 
in the context of broader state-civil society relationships. 
These are evolving with democratisation, but there are 
still elements of mutual mistrust in most countries. On 
the one hand, an active civil society may be seen as a 
potential political threat by government. On the other 
hand, both civil society and commercial private sector 
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actors may be sceptical (often justifiably?) about the real 
commitment on the part of government to partnership 
with non-state actors.
Within our sample of countries, there are perhaps 
only two where government actions demonstrate some 
sort of conviction that civil society contribution to policy 
dialogue will really enhance outcomes. Even these are 
qualified cases. As noted above, in Rwanda agricultural 
outcomes matter. Thus, the government is interested in 
hearing from anyone whom it believes is committed to 
improving outcomes. In practice, this leads to contrasting 
treatment of civil society groups. Those who are perceived 
to be committed to constructive engagement with 
government on policy matters are consulted pro-actively 
by the government, whilst those perceived as interested 
mainly in criticising the government (i.e. they resist 
encouragement to opt for constructive engagement 
instead) are excluded. In Rwanda the Agricultural 
Sector Working Group brings together government, 
donor, private sector and civil society actors in regular 
monthly meetings to track progress with policy and 
implementation. For civil society groups that have 
opted to engage the government constructively, access 
to policy making processes is perhaps unrivalled within 
the study countries (Golooba-Mutebi forthcoming). 
Meanwhile, in Ghana participatory decision making is 
a principle enshrined in the 1992 constitution and one 
that the National Development Planning Commission has 
tried to operationalize for sector strategy development 
(Kolavalli et al. 2010). The NPP government of President 
Kufuor also professed a particular commitment to private 
sector-led development and established a CAADP Private 
Sector Liaison Office (S.Asuming-Brempong, pers.comm). 
These observations notwithstanding, in accordance 
with the international consensus on good practice for 
aid effectiveness that emerged during the 2000s, 
non-state actors have been given (limited) space to 
participate in agricultural policy and strategy 
development in several of the study countries in recent 
years. Thus, for example, in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and 
Tanzania existing national agricultural strategies and 
plans were subject to quite broad (if perhaps superficial) 
consultation with private sector and civil society 
representatives. Participation in CAADP processes was, 
therefore, not novel and indeed – given the basic 
adoption of existing “CAADP-compliant” national 
strategies within these countries - was sometimes more 
limited than for the original development of the national 
strategy (Kolavalli et al. 2010; JM&Co 2011).
Ethiopia stands in some contrast to the other countries 
in the study, as increasing political control over 
non-governmental organisations and measures to 
restrict their engagement in effective policy advocacy 
were introduced via the CSO Proclamation (621/2009) 
around the same time as the CAADP Compact was signed 
in late 2009. In this environment, including non-state 
actors as signatories to the CAADP Compact represented 
a small success and one that suggests CAADP’s 
significance for the government as a way of accessing 
donor funding to support its ambitious agricultural goals 
(Berhanu 2013). However, one can question the lasting 
consequences of this – beyond this token act, the 
domestic imperatives for political control have prevailed.
Indeed, in most cases – but perhaps particularly in 
countries where political incentives to support 
smallholder agriculture are perceived as weak - the 
inclusion of non-state actors in CAADP processes has 
been something of a formality. It is hard to find examples 
of changes to strategies or plans as a result11. In all 
countries, including Ghana and Rwanda (Golooba-
Mutebi forthcoming, S.Asuming-Brempong pers.comm), 
government respondents are sceptical of civil society 
capacity to contribute to policy dialogues. There are few 
strong umbrella organisations for civil society groups 
interested in agriculture, and individual organisations 
often lack understanding of policy processes or the 
constraints, including financial, that governments 
operate under. 
The one country in the sample where civil society 
participation is said to have made a difference to the 
content of CAADP documents is Burkina Faso. Here, 
consultation with civil society actors was undertaken 
primarily at donor insistence. However, once embarked 
upon, it did add some value, with recognition of land 
issues being included in the Compact at the insistence 
of civil society groups (Loada forthcoming).
Turning to the second main way in which CAADP may 
have improved the quality of the agricultural planning 
process, the provision of expertise, we note that the main 
type of expertise on offer has been modelling expertise 
from IFPRI. The use of such modelling to encourage 
political commitment to agricultural investment in 
Rwanda has already been noted. However, whilst 
recognising the value of modelling exercises for such 
purposes, Kolavalli et al. 2010 also note their limitations: 
suitably disaggregated, modelling exercises might also 
assist with prioritisation within agricultural expenditure, 
but they are of limited use for detailed planning. This 
highlights the need for a broader spectrum of expertise 
to be made available to governments that are interested. 
Unfortunately, the weakness of CAADP’s pillar institutions 
has been relevant here (Brüntrup 2011).
We also highlight the phrase “governments that are 
interested”. Provision of expertise is an area that CAADP 
could strengthen. However, the benefit of this will 
depend on the will to use better information. In other 
words, is the constraint primarily on the demand or the 
supply side?
Before closing this section, we also briefly consider 
the notion of CAADP performing “due diligence” checks 
to ensure that national agricultural planning frameworks 
are adequate to guide the use of anticipated additional 
resources directed at the sector. The combination of weak 
domestic political incentives to deliver improved 
agricultural performance and heavy donor involvement 
in national expenditure means that, in many of the study 
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countries, agricultural strategies and even investment 
plans are “catch all” lists, comprising both the “wish lists” 
of the government and the various initiatives that 
particular donors would like to fund12. Lack of prioritisation 
is a significant weakness in planning processes (Tavakoli 
et al. 2013). However, this is not something that CAADP 
processes to date have sought to address. Rather, CAADP 
compliance has been assessed in terms of whether or 
not strategies reflect all four of the CAADP pillars. As the 
CAADP pillars are fairly generic, most national strategies 
could be presented as CAADP-compliant (Kolavalli et al. 
2010). Sometimes (for example, in Ethiopia, Ghana and 
Malawi) the CAADP investment plan has been an existing 
strategy repackaged to show conformity to the pillars, 
but with no real change in content. In Tanzania the 
stocktaking taskforce noted a number of gaps in the 
existing strategy, ASDP, so “ended by proposing a list of 
32 ‘areas of improvement’, that would distinguish the 
CAADP investment plan from ASDP” (Cooksey 2014). In 
other words, achieving CAADP compliance potentially 
made the lack of prioritisation worse, not better. The 
degree of “due diligence” is thus pretty low.
Donor Alignment
By focusing attention on a single national plan for the 
agricultural sector, CAADP also hopes to encourage 
greater donor alignment with national policy priorities 
and greater coordination of support for the agricultural 
sector across donors. However, CAADP is not the only 
force for change in this area. The 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, reinforced by the 2008 Accra 
Agenda for Action, commit donors to aligning their 
support behind “partner countries’ national development 
strategies and associated operational frameworks” (OECD 
undated, p1). In the agricultural sector, CAADP has 
provided a vehicle for operationalizing these principles, 
particularly for donors that had not been strong on 
harmonisation prior to 2008. 
Within our sample, Rwanda stands out as a country 
that has pro-actively sought to manage its relationships 
with donors and to shape the terms on which they 
engage. Rwanda gradates donors’ access to information 
and policy making according to the nature of their 
support to the national budget. It also encourages each 
donor to work in no more than three sectors, so as to 
facilitate coordination. At sector level, dialogue and 
coordination is focused on the Sector Working Group, 
which is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the 
lead ministry and the representative of the lead donor. 
This has been the practice in the agricultural sector since 
the CAADP round table and it works well, but “nothing 
specifically different has happened in the sector since 
the roundtable to distinguish it from other sectors in 
terms of donor-government relations” (Golooba-Mutebi 
forthcoming, p11).
Like Rwanda, Ethiopia takes a robust approach to 
donor relations, which, as already noted, became strained 
on more than one occasion during 2005-10. However, 
whilst seeking to maintain control of the discourse with 
donors (and pro-actively seeking other sources of 
investment in the economy to buttress its ability to do 
this), it has exhibited an increased openness in discussion 
with donors on agricultural policy over the past five years 
or so. One vehicle for this has been the Rural Economic 
Development and Food Security (RED&FS) Sector 
Working Group, which emerged out of dialogue between 
government and donors during 2007-08, i.e. prior to the 
official launch of the CAADP process in Ethiopia in 
September 2008. The RED & FS Sector Working Group 
has since become “the major body that oversees progress 
in the implementation of CAADP” (Berhanu 2013, p16). 
A steering committee comprising key representatives 
of the RED & FS Sector Working Group oversaw 
preparation of the national Policy and Investment 
Framework (PIF) for 2010-20. At the country’s CAADP 
Business Meeting in December 2010, donors committed 
to “Use the RED&FS SWG as the principal mechanism for 
dealing with issues related to (1) harmonization and 
alignment with the PIF; (2) executing elements of the 
Roadmap; (3) resolving technical, policy and operational 
constraints; and (4) identifying financial resources to 
support implementation” (Government of Ethiopia 2010).
Elsewhere, the CAADP process has also served a useful 
role in bringing donors together. This is well illustrated 
by the case of Malawi, where the Agriculture Sector Wide 
Approach (ASWAp), that formed the basis of the CAADP 
Compact, brought more donors to the same table than 
previous attempts to define an overarching strategy for 
the sector had done. The resulting Donor Committee on 
Agriculture and Food Security “meets on a monthly basis 
and provides donors with a common framework for 
engaging with government on strategic issues in the 
sector”. The result, according to one key informant, is 
that “donors do not come up with their own interests 
but are responding to the investment priorities outlined 
in the ASWAp” (Chinsinga forthcoming, p26).
There is, however, one danger in the trend towards 
“alignment” with national CAADP processes and this is 
that CAADP gets invoked to legitimise activity that is 
fundamentally not aligned with its core values. This 
concern is most salient in the case of initiatives to 
promote large-scale commercial investment in African 
agriculture, for example the Southern Agricultural 
Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) or aspects of the 
New Alliance agenda more broadly (Cooksey 
forthcoming)13. These initiatives promise to support 
implementation of CAADP investment plans and to bring 
“tangible benefits to smallholder farmers” (G8 2012). 
However, whether assisting the commercialisation of 
smallholder producers turns out to be a major emphasis 
of the envisaged private sector investments, let alone 
the major emphasis, remains to be seen.
Strategy Implementation
One of the more serious critiques of the CAADP 
enterprise to date is that it has focused heavily on sector 
strategies and investment plans, whilst in African 
agriculture formal strategies and plans are often not 
implemented effectively and sometimes hardly 
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implemented at all (see, for example, Cooksey 2012 and 
Poulton and Kanyinga 2013). This also means that, even 
if non-state actors do get to influence the formal strategy, 
they may still not affect policy in practice. 
Poor implementation of sector strategies and 
investment plans can be attributed to a number of 
factors. The first is weaknesses at the planning stage 
– in particular, a lack of prioritisation, as discussed 
above. This is likely to mean that financial or human 
resources (or both) are insufficient to implement all the 
proposed activities effectively, with a result either that 
a non-transparent selection process determines which 
ones do and do not go ahead14 or that most activities 
are undertaken in such a way as to achieve little impact. 
Some CAADP investment plans go significantly under-
funded (Benin et al. 2011), which illustrates this problem.
A second factor is low state capacity for programme 
implementation. This is impossible to fully separate from 
weaknesses at the planning stage, as planners should 
plan according to the capacity to implement. However, 
there are some particular challenges to implementation 
that deserve to be highlighted. As well as lack of funds 
or qualified personnel, programme implementation may 
be impeded by collective action problems within the 
political elite, as seen in Kenya (Poulton and Kanyinga 
2013), or by problems in centre-local relations, as 
detected in Tanzania (Therkildsen 2011). 
Incentive problems are compounded by the limited 
attention paid to monitoring and evaluation. Whilst 
donors are increasingly required to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their investments, this can lead to 
problems in implementation being downplayed when 
programmes are reviewed, as is suggested in the case 
of Tanzania (Cooksey 2012). 
State capacity for planning and implementation is 
largely given in the short run, but is endogenous to 
political will in the medium-long run. Perhaps predictably, 
the countries in our sample that show what can be done 
in the area of state capacity building for agricultural 
policy and programme implementation are Rwanda and 
Ethiopia. Rwanda has sought to introduce outcome-
based management at all levels of the state, through 
mechanisms such as annual leadership retreats, the 
annual national dialogue and the imihigo system of 
performance contracting (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2012). As well as investing heavily in its agricultural 
extension system, Ethiopia has recently established an 
Agricultural Transformation Agency to “address systemic 
bottlenecks in the agriculture sector” through problem 
solving, supporting implementation of solutions to 
critical problems and enhancing coordination among 
agricultural stakeholders (www.ata.gov.et/about/
our-mandate, Berhanu 2013).
In addition to political will, a second factor that 
facilitates state capacity building in Rwanda and Ethiopia 
is the time horizon of politicians. Results are required in 
a hurry because of the extent of the transformation that 
is sought, yet the degree of political dominance and/or 
control means that the government does not expect to 
be ousted at the next election. Hence, it can invest in 
public goods (including state capacity) that will yield 
high returns in terms of growth over the medium term. 
By contrast, elections in Malawi, Kenya and Ghana (and 
perhaps increasingly Tanzania) are fiercely contested and 
“impact” has to be achieved quickly, making transfer 
payments an attractive mechanism for wooing voters. 
To date CAADP processes have paid little attention to 
the implementation of agricultural strategies. This is a 
significant omission. It can be partly explained by the 
fact that the plans developed through CAADP processes 
have only been finalised fairly recently. However, an 
alternative approach would have been to start by trying 
to improve delivery on existing strategies (see Tavakoli 
et al. 2013 for a more general expression of this argument). 
Irrespective of past choices, implementation issues are 
now receiving greater attention through the mechanism 
of agricultural joint sector reviews. This is to be welcomed, 
although “the devil will be in the detail” when it comes 
to the effectiveness of such reviews in enhancing 
performance15.
  
Increasing Political Incentives for 
Investment in Smallholder 
Agriculture
This review has found that the achievements of CAADP 
to date have been modest. For most countries the 
commitments made by the Head of State in Maputo in 
2003 did not translate into practical action to support 
smallholder farmers, nor even to clear ownership of the 
national CAADP process. There is little evidence that 
CAADP processes have enhanced the quality of national 
agricultural planning, whilst focus on the (non-)
implementation of strategies and plans is a very recent 
phenomenon.
Based on previous FAC PEAPA work, we have 
distinguished between countries with strong domestic 
political incentives to invest in smallholder agriculture 
(in our sample, most obviously Rwanda and Ethiopia) 
and those where such incentives are weaker. The former 
have used CAADP, rather as intended, as a way of making 
the case for greater investment in agriculture and to seek 
increased donor funding for national agricultural 
strategies and plans. (We are not sure how successful 
they have been in gaining extra funding, however). The 
latter have gone through the CAADP process more as a 
formality, hence gaining little from it. This emphasises 
the importance of domestic political incentives in 
influencing agricultural policy and planning and hence 
influencing outcomes. 
As CAADP goes forward, therefore, a major question 
is: what can it do to strengthen political incentives to 
invest in smallholder agriculture in the (majority of ) 
countries where these incentives are still quite weak?
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Before answering this, however, we should answer a 
prior question: Why should CAADP go forward, in light 
of the assessment above? Despite its limited impact “on 
the ground” to date, CAADP is uniquely placed to 
encourage governments to respond to important 
opportunities for African agriculture. The 2007-08 and 
2011 international food price spikes showed the costs 
of relying on food imports whilst neglecting domestic 
agricultural production. Real food prices are expected 
to remain above early 2000s levels for some years to 
come. This is a political threat, but an opportunity for 
African agriculture. Another opportunity lies in Africa’s 
huge untapped agricultural potential (World Bank 2009), 
as global populations continue to rise but rates of 
production growth slow down in other regions. Some 
African governments have clearly spotted the implied 
potential for agricultural growth, including exports. 
Neither of these opportunities necessarily inclines 
governments towards investment in smallholder 
agriculture. However, increasing inequality (especially 
in Africa’s mineral-rich economies) and the limited 
translation of overall economic growth into poverty 
reduction under such circumstances make a compelling 
case for promoting smallholder-led growth in agriculture. 
Meanwhile, CAADP is now established on the African 
agricultural policy scene, at continental, regional and 
(unevenly) at national level. It is uniquely placed as an 
African Union programme that can access Heads of State, 
Ministers of Agriculture and Finance and can tap into 
any developing sense of African renaissance16. The AU’s 
designation of 2014 as the Year of Agriculture and Food 
Security shows both the renewed political interest in 
agriculture and the opportunity that CAADP has to 
reinforce this. CAADP should build on this renewed 
interest in agriculture, including interest in the New 
Alliance agenda for increased commercial investment 
in the sector17, but use its engagement to argue the case 
for investing in support of smallholders.
CAADP has always faced the tension between 
reflecting and enhancing political interest in agriculture. 
As it looks forward, it has to seek to harness the 
commitment of leaders and countries where domestic 
political incentives for investment in agriculture are high, 
so as to provide peer encouragement for others. It also 
has to be open to new “hooks”, such as the New Alliance, 
that draw additional countries into meaningful 
engagement with CAADP. For countries where domestic 
political incentives are weak, but there is at least formal 
recognition of the need to invest in agriculture, CAADP 
can offer ideas for ways forward – facilitating sharing of 
good practice – but also use collective high-level political 
commitments to embed particular practices within 
national processes. Its objective in all countries should 
be to add value to country processes, rather than to 
prescribe them, as the experience summarised here 
shows that pursuing a prescribed process as a formality 
achieves little. This implies a further evolution of thinking 
beyond that which occurred during 2006-10.
Finally, one of the reasons why political incentives for 
investing in smallholder agriculture are weak in many 
African countries is the weakness of rural-oriented civil 
society groups. Championing the participation of such 
groups in policy processes will thus on its own achieve 
little. However, experience from elsewhere (for example, 
Latin America or India) shows that a combination of 
pressure from outside government plus advocacy within 
the policy process can be effective. It is beyond the scope 
and capability of CAADP to build the capacity of rural-
oriented civil society groups in Africa. However, it can 
seek to enhance the information flows that they need 
to become more effective advocates for pro-smallholder 
agricultural policy.
The following paragraphs develop these ideas further, 
drawing on the insights from the analysis in the earlier 
parts of the paper. They are structured around discussion 
of five possible levers for increasing political commitment 
to supporting smallholder agriculture.
Heads of State
One of the disappointments of the decade since the 
Maputo declaration is that the commitment by Heads 
of State has translated into so little real action or 
investment. Few countries that were devoting less than 
10% of their budget to agriculture in 2003 are now 
devoting more than 10% to it. Equally, few countries 
seized the CAADP process as an opportunity to effectively 
make the case for increased support to agriculture, rather 
than going through it formally at the suggestion of 
others.
There are various possible explanations for this. The 
“false start” of bankable investment projects during 2003-
05, leading to redefinition of the approach by 2006-07, 
did not help, especially as Heads of State get replaced 
periodically. The low level of institutionalisation in many 
African political systems means that commitment by one 
leader is viewed more as a personal commitment than 
as a national one by his/her successor, especially if the 
successor comes from a different political party.
In political systems characterised by generally low 
accountability, it is, of course, fairly easy to sign up to a 
commitment such as the Maputo declaration (to gain 
peer approval). This does not necessarily convey full 
political commitment when there are urgent competing 
priorities or where there are collective action problems 
within national political leaderships. (Involving Ministers 
of Finance and Agriculture as well may help here, but 
may still only partially address the problem). Some 
internal disputes and obstacles may be unforeseen at 
the time of the commitment, as was probably the case 
for Kenya (Poulton and Kanyinga 2013), where President 
Kibaki might otherwise have been expected to be a 
strong champion for a NEPAD programme.
Working Paper 077 www.future-agricultures.org12
 By contrast, for some Heads of State who did share 
the NEPAD pan-African vision, the Maputo declaration 
does seem to have spurred subsequent action. The cases 
of Rwanda and Ghana were noted above. This suggests 
the value of framing a new Heads of State commitment 
for the second decade of CAADP (as is indeed going to 
happen in 2014), so that the current generation of 
political leaders can own their own commitment to 
agriculture, which for some of them will be a personal 
spur to champion the cause.
Information Sharing
This should be a major theme for CAADP, but it has at 
least two distinct components. The first is the sharing of 
good practice and understanding. Under CAADP to date, 
provision of knowledge and expertise has focused on:
•	 Technical knowledge related to the four 
investment “pillars”, which has been 
the responsibility of the selected pillar 
institutions. These have functioned unevenly 
(Brüntrup 2011; JM&Co 2011).
•	 Modelling support, provided by IFPRI, for 
the stocktaking exercises. The strengths 
(advocacy for agricultural investment) and 
weaknesses (limited ability to contribute to 
detailed planning) of this were noted earlier.
In addition, good practice in policy design has been 
incorporated into the guidelines for implementing the 
CAADP country process (NEPAD 2010). By contrast, little 
attention has been paid to what constitutes good 
agricultural policy or on institutional models that have 
proven effective in delivering such policy. These deserve 
greater attention.
This paper argues that CAADP should seek to add 
value to existing national agricultural planning (and 
evaluation) processes, rather than to prescribe them. This 
suggests:
•	 an emphasis on principles, rather than 
guidelines – combined with independent 
assessment of how national processes 
perform against these principles (see below)
•	 an information brokering role, to facilitate 
access to good practice and understanding. 
Where good practice is concerned, the 
CAADP secretariat may actually come to 
possess plenty of this knowledge itself, 
especially if it manages independent 
assessments of on-going national processes. 
It can then advise governments that wish to 
improve their performance (and ratings!). In 
the case of understanding, CAADP should 
develop relationships with major research 
institutions and networks that study African 
agricultural policy and processes, and seek 
to expose policy makers to their most 
interesting findings.
 
The second component to information sharing relates 
more to accountability. At present, comparative 
assessment of agricultural investment and performance 
is undertaken by ReSAKSS and by occasional independent 
studies. Eventually, the resulting information becomes 
freely available on the internet. However, there are major 
problems with both indicators and data that limit its 
value for accountability purposes. Perhaps the most 
striking example concerns the 10% budget share target:
•	 Firstly, although CAADP has a preferred 
definition of “agriculture” (the COFOG 
definition plus expenditure on agricultural 
research), in practice the definition used 
varies across countries (see World Bank 2013 
and endnote 8 below, as an example)18. This 
makes cross-country comparison difficult.
•	 Secondly, data on budgets, but even more 
so on actual expenditures, are hard to 
obtain - especially at the disaggregated level 
necessary to compile a total “agriculture” 
figure. Hence, available comparative country 
data can be quite dated. For example, the 
oft-cited Fan et al. 2009 study uses data from 
2004-08 depending on the country.
Particularly if civil society is to become more engaged 
in debates on agricultural public expenditure in Africa 
(how much? what is it spent on? how well is it spent?), 
data need to be much more readily available.  Ideally, 
data on agricultural expenditure, according to 
standardised definitions and classifications19 for ready 
comparison, should be available on an annual basis. The 
2014 declaration by African Heads of State presents an 
opportunity to gain cross-country commitments to 
provide CAADP with this data, which can then be publicly 
disseminated via the CAADP website. This opportunity 
should be seized20. 
A second type of information that could usefully be 
disseminated for accountability purposes is the results 
of independent assessment of country processes for 
agricultural planning and evaluation of implementation. 
Here is how such assessments could work. Instead of 
prescribing a standard “CAADP process” that all countries 
should follow, CAADP could:
1. set out principles for both national planning and 
evaluation processes. These principles would 
encapsulate good practice in planning and 
evaluation.
2. develop criteria, related to these principles, for 
assessing actual practice. The criteria might be 
expected, for example, to include a number of 
indicators relating to: the breadth, depth and 
effectiveness of civil society participation in 
planning and evaluation processes21; prioritisation 
Working Paper 077 www.future-agricultures.org13
in planning; the quality of evidence underlying 
planning decisions and evaluation processes.
3. organise teams to conduct regular assessments in 
each country. Assessments of national planning 
processes should occur at least once every five 
years, preferably when a new agricultural strategy 
is developed. Assessments of implementation 
processes should occur every two-three years. Each 
country could nominate a small number of national 
assessors. A review team could then consist of: the 
national CAADP focal point, one national assessor 
from the host nation, two assessors (selected by 
CAADP) from the pool of assessors nominated by 
other countries, and a team leader (selected by 
CAADP, from either the AU’s own staff or from the 
relevant REC).  
4. present the findings at an in-country workshop.
5. publish the results on its website. 
Participation of Non-State Actors in 
Agricultural Policy Processes
Our review found that formal inclusion of non-state 
actors in CAADP processes has rarely increased the level 
of participation in agricultural planning beyond existing 
norms. Perhaps even more importantly, these existing 
norms of participation are not yet perceived to have 
made much difference to policy on the continent. This 
is in part due to the weakness of existing rural-oriented 
civil society groups and/or their representative 
organisations and often to a continuing mutual mistrust 
between states and non-state actors. It should also be 
noted that state agencies have bureaucratic vested 
interests (for example, to protect their budgets and not 
to have to work too hard in exchange for them) and will 
only concede real power if forced to. Championing the 
participation of non-state actors in policy processes – 
even if this is extended to cover joint sector reviews 
(evaluation of implementation) and not just planning 
– is, therefore, not a “silver bullet” for better policy.
On the other hand, the lack of effective rural voice 
contributes to weak political incentives for investing in 
smallholder agriculture in many African countries. Few 
states are incentivised to promote broad-based growth 
in the way that Rwanda and Ethiopia are, so enabling 
rural-oriented civil society groups to play a more effective 
role in agricultural policy making has to be a long-term 
objective. There is only so much that CAADP can do here. 
However, this includes:
•	 Encouraging real participation in policy 
processes, through the principles for 
good agricultural policy making and the 
assessment of performance according to 
those principles (see above)
•	 Using its political influence through the 
African Union to procure better public 
information about agricultural policy 
processes and investment (as above), for 
civil society groups to use in advocacy work
•	 Developing a network of major rural-oriented 
civil society organisations, at continental or 
perhaps regional level, and encouraging 
and equipping them to use the information 
thereby made available.
Role of RECS
The various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
are the implementing agencies of AU at regional level. 
They have had a role in CAADP implementation at least 
since 2005 and are charged with taking “leadership in 
stimulating, coordinating and facilitating support 
(financial, expert/technical, information etc.) for country 
CAADP implementation processes” (NEPAD 2010, p7). In 
practice, their engagement in CAADP has varied. ECOWAS 
has been the most active, catalysing national CAADP 
processes in a number of West African states in 2008-09 
and in the process contributing to the resurgence in 
interest in CAADP from the international community. 
More recently, COMESA has also sought to encourage 
national CAADP processes in its region. 
As with most African institutions (including the NEPAD 
Secretariat and the AU Commission), RECs are not well 
funded. ECOWAS is a partial exception here, as its 
institutions receive core funding from a community levy 
raised via the ECOWAS area common external tariff. 
Nevertheless, even with limited funding, RECs could play 
a useful role in future CAADP processes in their region, 
for example by:
•	 Promoting the exchange of information, 
amongst governments (regarding good 
practice in agricultural policy, institutional 
development for agricultural policy and/
or policy design and evaluation processes) 
and civil society organisations (assisting 
them to access and evaluate information 
on agricultural public expenditure by 
governments in their region and the findings 
of independent assessments of country 
processes for agricultural planning and 
evaluation).
•	 Participating in the independent assessment 
exercises, for example by supplying team 
leaders for evaluation teams and contributing 
to the dissemination of findings.
RECs also have a regional trade promotion role, which 
is relevant to the agricultural sector. They can seek to 
promote freer trade in agricultural products within 
regions and champion other initiatives where there is a 
clear advantage to acting regionally, for example 
promoting regional harmonisation of seed certification 
procedures and greater regional cooperation in 
agricultural research. So far, however, their voice has been 
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muted where policy issues are concerned, even when 
these fall squarely within their remit. The case of 
agricultural export bans in eastern and southern Africa 
is a case in point.
This raises the question of the circumstances under 
which RECs might be expected to act as independent 
agents with the power and inclination to influence 
domestic agricultural policy in countries in their region. 
Given that the RECs’ ultimate authority is derived from 
these states, they can only exert effective pressure for 
better agricultural policy where nation states have 
conceded a degree of sovereignty to their REC and this 
has been consolidated through institutionalisation. (The 
European Union provides an example of this sort of 
process). Concession of sovereignty is only likely to occur 
in pursuit of objectives beyond agricultural growth, for 
example, the establishment of a regional trade zone or 
security force or the introduction of a common regional 
currency. Agricultural policy could then benefit, however. 
Only ECOWAS has taken steps in this direction. It has a 
parliament and commission that can in theory act as 
independent sources of policy pressure. In general we 
should not expect RECs to do much beyond promoting 
the exchange of information on agricultural policy and 
participating in independent assessment exercises 
during the second decade of CAADP.
Donor pressure
Donors have been major supporters of CAADP since 
2009. CAADP’s attraction, in an era of evolving good 
practice for aid effectiveness, is that it can claim to be 
African owned and led. However, in practice, domestic 
political incentives to support smallholder agriculture 
remain weak in many African countries and, as a result, 
national ownership of the CAADP process has often also 
been weak. In these contexts, donors have found 
themselves not so much supporting a national process 
as pushing it, with the result that the dynamics of the 
process have been changed22.
The proposals outlined in previous sections assume 
(and, therefore, require) that African institutions at 
continental and regional level will run the process. 
Critically, they also assume that national governments 
will both allow them to do this and cooperate in important 
ways (providing annual budget information, contributing 
to and welcoming assessment teams). If these proposals 
are implemented, donors should be beneficiaries of the 
changes. They will still be able to engage in national 
agricultural planning and policy processes. Moreover, if 
the greater accountability of governments to peers and 
civil society, plus exchange of information on good 
practice, results in more efficient and effective processes, 
the policy environment into which they invest their 
financial support should improve, enhancing impact (a 
major concern for donor agencies under political pressure 
back home). For donors looking to scale up their 
assistance to agriculture, the independent assessment 
of policy processes across countries should provide some 
indication of where incremental investment could be 
productively allocated.
To what extent should donors support the envisaged 
process itself? Such support could be channelled to AU/
NEPAD or to RECs, perhaps via trust funds dedicated to 
facilitating CAADP processes (much as with the current 
multi-donor trust fund). This money could be used, for 
example, to pay for the work of assessment teams or to 
support information dissemination activities. It may be 
that the proposals envisaged above are only workable 
with donor support. The dilemma, however, is that heavy 
dependence on donor funding both reflects and projects 
lack of national (or broader African) ownership, which 
would not bode well for the process. Greater funding of 
pan-African institutions by African governments is 
desirable.
Finally, donors can continue to support African civil 
society organisations engaged in advocacy on agricultural 
policy issues. There would be synergies between capacity 
building investment in such organisations on the one 
hand and greater access for them to information and to 
agricultural policy processes through CAADP on the 
other. Again, though, donor investment in such 
organisations carries its own dangers. Thus, donors may 
consider delivering such support at “arm’s length” 
through credible intermediary organisations (Booth 
2012).
END NOTES
1 The paper is an output of the Political Economy of 
Agricultural Policy in Africa workstream within the 
DFID-funded Future Agricultures Consortium 
(www.future-agricultures.org/peapa). All the 
authors contribute to this workstream. All except 
Colin Poulton have produced country case studies 
that underpin the findings in this paper.
2 The second CAADP target – to achieve 6% per 
annum growth in the agricultural sector – emerged 
during this period. According to NEPAD Planning 
and Coordinating Agency 2010 (p1), 6% is “the rate 
which modelling suggests is required in order to 
impact poverty and hunger”.
3 www.nepad-caadp.net/pdf/Table%201%20
Countries%20with%20Investment%20Plans%20
ver19.pdf provides a summary of progress with the 
CAADP process around Africa.
4  See Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 (p37) for a 
discussion of the particular incentives that flow 
from threats of “intermediate intensity and urgency”.
5 Even Collier 2007 (p62) grudgingly accepts that 
smallholder agriculture might have a role to play 
in a growth and poverty reduction strategy under 
such circumstances!
6 There is thus some room for debate as to whether 
observed lack of progress with agricultural policy 
implementation reflects weak political incentives 
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or collective action problems that hinder delivery 
in response to them.
7 Nevertheless, one of outcomes of the CAADP 
process was the conclusion that Burkina should aim 
to spend at least 16% of its national budget on 
agriculture (Loada forthcoming).
8 Unconventionally, Ghana includes both feeder road 
investment and an element of debt relief in its 
calculation of agricultural expenditure. Note also 
that the share of actual expenditure rose despite 
agriculture’s ex ante share of the budget fluctuating 
between 6-8% throughout the period (World Bank 
2013).
9 The Government of Ghana began promoting 
CAADP within the country even before the official 
commitment by Heads of State at Maputo in July 
2003.
10 Indeed, in Malawi, the donors’ hope that the CAADP 
process would create greater space to discuss 
investments other than the input subsidy 
programme were dashed. Over 70% of the funding 
envisaged by the investment plan is for the input 
subsidy programme and the so-called Green Belt 
Initiative that was championed by ex-President 
Mutharika (Chinsinga forthcoming).
11 Similar critiques of non-state actor participation are 
found in the literature on PRSPs (see, for example, 
Whitfield 2010 on Ghana).
12 Rwanda and Ethiopia are exceptions to these 
statements. In these countries, as agricultural 
outcomes matter to political survival and/or 
stability, formal strategies and plans are serious 
documents of intent (see, for example, Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2012 for Rwanda).
13 Tanzania also provides a case where CAADP has 
done little for donor alignment. Instead of providing 
a dominant national policy to which donors could 
align, TAFSIP has simply added another layer to 
pre-existing agricultural ‘policies,’ without resolving 
any of the underlying tensions between them 
(Cooksey forthcoming). Meanwhile, with the new 
emphasis on public-private partnerships in 
initiatives such as SAGCOT and the New Alliance, 
some fear that (some) bilateral donors will realign 
their agricultural support to ‘their’ corporate 
interests, not to national policy.
14 Kolavalli et al. 2010 observe that “cabinet members 
in Ghana are often taken to retreats to discuss 
budgets” (p20). Their point is that the CAADP 
process is poorly integrated with critical political 
decision-making processes. However, these are also 
non-transparent.
15 Sceptically, governments may be expected to resist 
thorough-going reviews and donors may wish to 
maintain an appearance of reasonable effectiveness 
in the use of their funds, whilst non-state actors 
may not be powerful enough to insist on more 
critical findings even if these are justified. Indeed, 
if not selected and backed by strong representative 
groupings, the non-state actor “representatives” 
may have their own reasons for being cooperative 
and going along with positive reviews. On the other 
hand, for example, where rent-seeking by 
decentralised administrative tiers is seen to 
undermine policy implementation, a central 
government could find such reviews a useful, 
“detached” (if political risky) way of strengthening 
accountability and incentivising better delivery.
16 This can cut both ways. NEPAD was the vision of a 
broadly like-minded group of African leaders who 
were convinced that, if Africa wanted to thrive in 
the globalised world of the twenty-first century and 
not risk marginalisation, then its countries and 
leaders had to act together (Rukato 2010). A 
growing sense of optimism on the continent could 
mean that leaders no longer feel the need for 
pan-African efforts to tackle common problems: 
they can go it alone.
17 http//:www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/18/fact-sheet-new-alliance- food
18 Given CAADP’s emphasis on market access, there 
is a good case for expenditure on rural feeder roads 
to be included.
19 Differentiating between salaries, operational 
expenditures and capital investments is an obvious 
distinction. However, given the valuable role that 
CAADP can play in establishing “norms” for public 
goods investment, it would also be valuable to 
compare expenditure on key public goods – for 
example, agricultural research, extension, rural 
roads, irrigation– both across countries and with 
transfer expenditures within the same country. 
Some of these have salary, operational and capital 
components. Benin and Yu 2013 explore these 
issues in greater depth.
20 ONE 2013 (p11) calls for “citizen’s budgets that 
disaggregate the entire [agriculture] sector’s 
budget by programme” to be made available online, 
to enable “citizens to follow the money and monitor 
that services and results are delivered”. Our proposal 
would make such budgets comparable across 
countries. 
21 Africa Lead is producing a number of policy capacity 
assessments that pilot a similar approach.
22 This characterisation applies even in Malawi, where 
political commitment to the farm input subsidy 
programme is unwavering, but the incentives to 
support smallholder agriculture more generally are 
much weaker (Chinsinga forthcoming).
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